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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 1994, 8 (4), 313-327

Depressive Deficits in Word Identification and Recall
Paula T. Hertel
Trinity University, San Antonio, USA

Depressed and nondepressed adults rated positive, negative, and neutral
nouns for their emotional value or their physical curvature. Next, they tried
to identify previously rated and unrated words that were presented quite
briefly and masked. Depressed subjects' identification showed a reduced
effect of prior exposure in the curvature task but no deficit when words had
been rated for emotion. On a subsequent test of free recall, both a depressive
deficit and a rating effect obtained. These results suggest that depressed
people are less likely to process beyond the requirements of the task.

INTRODUCTION

Depressive deficits in measures of memory occur mainly when the tasks
permit variation in individual control of processing. Nondepressed subjects
spontaneously engage uninstructed procedures, whereas depressed subjects
are more likely to do merely what they are told. This proposed difference
can be subsumed under the term: Depressive deficits in cognitive initiative
(Hertel & Hardin, 1990). Deficient initiative during initial exposure to
materials or during subsequent tests of memory can result in impaired
performance on a variety of such tests.
"Cognitive initiative" is another term for cognitive self-control. A
similar concept, effortful or controlled processing, plays a central role in
many cognitive theories (see Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Posner & Snyder,
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1975). These theories propose that a continuum ranging from automatic
to controlled processing represents the degree to which attention
characterises the cognitive operations in question. This continuum does
not, however, capture the varying extent to which controlled procedures
are wilfully initiated versus cued by external characteristics of the task.
Consider as a example the laboratory requirement to decide if a word fits
sensibly into a sentence frame-a decision that requires attention to the
meaning of the word and the frame. Some subjects will make that decision
quickly and then wait for the next trial, whereas others will continue to
attend to the word in the context of the sentence and further elaborate its
meaning. This difference reflects the extent to which controlled procedures
are initiated by the subject. Moreover, the difference can be reduced
through external control, such as the requirement to repeat the word and
report the decision at the end of the trial.
Support for the initiative account of depressive deficits comes from tests
of recognition, free recall, and metacognitive judgements (Channon,
Baker, & Robertson, 1993; Hertel, submitted; Hertel & Hardin, 1990;
Hertel & Rude, 1991; Slife & Weaver, 1992). For example, Hertel and
Rude (1991) varied the degree of constraint inherent in the incidental
learning task of deciding whether words fit sensibly into sentence frames.
Clinically depressed subjects subsequently recalled fewer words than did
nondepressed controls or subjects recovered from depressive episodes, but
only after having participated under relatively unconstrained learning
conditions. Maintaining depressed subjects' focus during the learning task
(by requiring that they repeat the word and report the decision at the end
of each 8 second trial) eliminated the depressive deficit in later free recall.
This finding indicates that the performance of depressed subjects in the
unconstrained condition suffered from reduced initiative in attending to
the words in the context of the frames. Rather than focusing their attention
on the task at hand, they allowed their minds to wander or go blank (see
Watts & Sharrock, 1985).
Hertel and Rude's (1991) findings demonstrate the general importance
of cognitive initiative during initial exposure, but they. do not delineate the
specific procedures that were underemployed. The word itself might have
received reduced attention, or the sentence frame might not have been
used to its best elaborative advantage in establishing routes for later recall.
The experiment reported below was designed to pinpoint deficits in
initiative at the level of attending to words during their first exposure. This
issue was addressed by using an indirect test of memory (see Johnson &
Hasher, 1987). As explained next, this test reflects the extent to which
words have been integrated as lexical units during their prior exposure.
Direct tests, such as free recall, are those that place subjects in the
position of deliberately attempting to remember past events. They are
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sensitive to variations in prior elaborative processing and to strategies for
retrieval. In contrast, indirect tests are designed to assess more automatic
effects of past experience on a current task that is not purported to be a
test of memory. The indirect test employed in this research was the word
identification test. After initial exposure to a list, words from the list and
new words are presented very briefly (typically 34 milliseconds) on a
computer screen and followed by perceptual masks. The subject's task is
to read the words aloud. Iden.tification serves as a test of memory because
previously exposed words are identified more frequently than are new
words; it serves as an indirect test because conscious attention is devoted
to the present task of reading, rather than to the problem of remembering
past events. 1
The word-identification test is well suited to the job of distinguishing
among the procedures that might have been initiated during earlier
exposure (e.g. integrating letters into lexical units versus elaborating the
meaning of those units by thinking of related words or episodes). We
know, for example, that manipulations of elaborative processing, that
typically affect performance on direct tests of memory, often have no
effects or opposite effects on word identification (e.g. Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby
& Dallas, 1981). The levels-of-processing effect (better memory for
conceptually processed words than for words processed nonconceptually)
is not typically obtained (see Challis & Brodbeck, 1992). Instead,
identification is sensitive to changes in typography and other visual
characteristics with respect to the initial display (Graf & Ryan, 1990;
Jacoby, 1983; Jacoby & Hayman, 1987).
To capitalise on these findings regarding the physical versus conceptual
features of words, the design of the present experiment included a
processing manipulation in the initial phase; half of the words were rated
for their emotional value to the subjects and the other half were rated for
physical curvature (how round or angular the shape of the word appeared).
This manipulation loosely conforms to a levels-of-processing manipulation.
In order to rate emotional value, the subjects must attend to the meaning
of the word, whereas the curvature ratings do not require conceptual
processing. Indeed, the curvature ratings do not require the letters to be
integrated as a unit in any way other than their physical shape; the word
as a lexical or semantic unit need not be processed.
This difference between the two rating tasks is central to the present
concern, because it presents the opportunity for initiative in reading the
1

Probably no test of memory is a pure measure of either automatic or controlled use of

prior experience (see Jacoby, Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993). In comparison to other indirect tests

(e.g. stem completion), however, word identification presents little opportunity for conscious
reflection on the prior o ccurrence of the word.
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words in one of the rating conditions. Further, a number of investigations
have demonstrated that word integration is a sufficient prerequisite for
obtaining effects of prior exposure on subsequent word identification (e.g.
Hayman & Jacoby, 1989; Whittlesea & Cantwell, 1987). Consequently, if
depressed subjects voluntarily attend to the words per se in the noncon
ceptual task less frequently than do nondepressed subjects, their perfor
mance on word identification should show a reduced effect of prior
exposure. In contrast, we should not observe a depressive impairment in
identification of words that had been rated for emotional value; subjects
were expected to profit similarly from having read those words in the
earlier phase. Further, the use of emotion ratings in place of other
conceptual tasks was intended to ensure this finding, on the belief that
emotional matters are central to the concerns of depressed people (see
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).
Finally, the indirect test was followed by a test of free recall of rated
words. Although the results of this test must be interpreted cautiously,
given additional exposure on the test of word identification, it was included
for the purposes of replicating the ubiquitous finding of a depressive deficit
in free recall (e.g. Ellis, Thomas, & Rodriguez, 1984) and demonstrating
a functional dissociation with respect to direct and indirect measures of
depressive memory (see Roediger & McDermott, 1992). In the present
context, a functional dissociation is predicted only for words rated
according to their emotional value. Such words should produce depressive
deficits on the direct test, but not on the indirect test. If depressed subjects
voluntarily attend to fewer words on the curvature task, however, these
words should be both less frequently identified and less available for
intentional retrieval.
In summary of the method: Depressed and nondepressed subjects
participated in an experiment with four main phases. First, they rated a
set of emotional and neutral words for their emotional value and another
set of like words for physical curvature. Secondly, they performed a test
of word identification by attempting to read previously rated and new
words that appeared very briefly. Thirdly, they attempted free recall of
rated words. Finally, they were assessed for verbal intelligence, depression,
and anxiety.
In review of the expectations: (a) Depressive deficits should occur at
the level of integrating letters into words when this procedure is not
required; that is, the effect of prior exposure in the curvature task on later
identification should be reduced for depressed subjects. (b) Depressed
subjects should recall fewer words overall. In short, I hoped to find
evidence for deficient attentional and elaborative processing in depression
by way of their presumed effects on word identification and free recall,
respectively.
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METHOD
Materials

We selected 64 nouns according to their emotional value from norms
established by Brown and Ure (1969) and Rubin and Friendly (1986) and
according to frequencies determined by Kucera and Francis (1967). No
attempt was made to control for inter-item association. Sixteen words were
positive, 16 negative, and 32 neutral in emotional tone. Ratings for
emotional words exceeded 5. 0 on a 7-point scale; they fell below 2.8 for
neutral words; means were 5.6 (emotional) and 2.2 (neutral). Mean word
frequencies were 48 (emotional) and 43 (neutral). Numbers of letters ranged
from 4 to 9; means were 6.0 for both emotional and neutral words.
The 64 nouns were arranged into four sets that each
included 4 positive, 4 negative, and 8 neutral words. In arranging them,
we attempted to produce similar means on the emotional norms, frequences,
and numbers of letters, both across types of words within sets (where
appropriate) and across sets within types of words. The 4 sets were
combined into 2 lists, with 2 blocks of 16 words in each, such that the
means on the various dimensions were nearly equal across the 2 lists.
Each block began with a neutral word, but was otherwise arranged randomly.
For each subject, just one list was employed during the rating tasks, with one
block assigned for emotional ratings and the other for curvature ratings. The
other list served as new (unrated) words on the test of word identification.
Rating Lists.

Word Identification.

The 64 nouns all appeared on the test list. They
were arranged into blocks of 16, such that each block contained 1 positive,
1 negative, and 2 neutral words from each of the 4 sets used in the rating
tasks (2 lists, each with 2 blocks). The order of words within each block
was constrained so that not more than 2 words from the same rating-task
set occurred consecutively; otherwise it was random.
A practice list was used as a method of selecting the duration of
exposure for each subject on the word-identification test. (This practice is
designed to avoid individual floor and ceiling effects.) It consisted of 18
additional words with approximately the same characteristics as the neutral
experimental words. Six of these words were again used in practice trials
at the beginning of the test.
Procedure

As part of the procedure for informed consent, subjects were told that they
would be making different kinds of decisions about words presented on
the monitor (attached to an IBM-XT computer). The practice program
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began with instructions that were also rephrased aloud by the experi
menter, who then invited questions. Instructions emphasised the very brief
duration of the upcoming words and the speed of their presentation.
Subjects were advised that they might not believe that they actually saw a
word and encouraged to blurt out a guess because it did not matter if they
were right or wrong. Instructions ended with the warning to fix their gaze
at the centre of the screen. The 18 words on the practice test were arranged
in blocks of 3; in each block the first word was exposed for 133msec, the
second for 100msec, and the third for 67msec. Each word was centred on
the row and line and masked by a row of 10 ampersands, exposed for
33msec in the same location. A 2500msec blank screen separated trials.
(Words in all tasks were displayed in white letters against a black
background.) Subjects read the words aloud, and the experimenter
checked the accuracy of the response. Only exact readings were counted
as accurate. With this information in hand, the experimenter determined
the exposure duration for the main test by identifying the duration on the
practice task that produced either two or three correct identifications out
of the six attempts. If 133msec or lOOmsec were so identified, then 33msec
were subtracted to produce the duration for the later test. If the identified
duration was 67msec, however, SOmsec was selected for the test. Subjects
who identified four or more words presented at 67msec were assigned to
a 33msec duration.
Next, subjects performed the rating tasks, with instructions and
materials presented on the monitor. Half of the subjects rated the first
block of 16 words for their emotional value and the second block for
curvature; the remaining subjects received the reversed order. The order
of the two blocks of words was counterbalanced with the order of the rating
tasks. Instructions were given before each block and augmented by the
experimenter, if necessary. They stressed that subjects should determine
how emotional (or curvey) the word appeared to them. Examples were
provided. Each trial consisted of a 6sec presentation of the word in the
centre of the screen, followed by a rating scale at the top of the next screen
and a "Rating" prompt at the bottom. The scale contained equally spaced
numbers from 1 to 7, with "not at all
1" at the beginning of the line,
and "7
very" at the end of the line. The scale and prompt remained
on the screen until the subject typed in a legal response, at which time the
next word appeared.
After the experimenter took about 2 minutes to store the rating data
and bring up the next program, the main test of word identification began.
Instructions reminded subjects about the practice test and warned that
there would be more words on the current task. The 4 blocks of words
were presented in one of four different orders (ABCD, BADC, CDAB,
or DCBA), with 6 practice trials at the beginning and a rest break in
=

=
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the middle. Exposure durations for the words were constant (100, 67, 50,
or 33msec). Each word was masked by a row of 10 ampersands for 33msec,
which was followed by a 2500msec blank screen.
Immediately after the identification test, subjects were instructed for
free recall of the rated words. Next, they filled out the Beck Depression
Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). The
experimenter administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised
(WAIS-R) Vocabulary Subscale. Then she conducted an interview
that provided information about age, education, history of psychological
treatment, and prescribed and nonprescribed drugs currently or recently
used by the subject. The interview progressed through a series of questions
that allowed us to use Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC; Spitzer,
Endicott, & Robins, 1978). The experimenter's notes were independently
scored by two judges, trained to use RDC, who agreed completely on
the placement of each subject into one of the following categories: definite
major depression (unipolar); probable major depression; definite minor
depression; or no depression. Each interview was also assessed for
evidence of symptoms of anxiety that accompany depression or evidence
of anxiety disorder (no depression). After the interview, subjects were
thoroughly debriefed and paid $10, plus transportation costs.

Subjects and Assignment
Criteria.

Universal criteria for participation included: (a) age ranging
from 25 to 55 years; (b) a high-school diploma or its equivalent; (c) fluency
in English; (d) no uncorrected difficulties in vision; (e) no prior history of
shock treatment, organic impairment, seizures, or thought disorder; and
(f) no recent history of substance abuse. All depressed subjects had prior
diagnoses of depression, with no evidence of manic episodes and were
required to meet RDC for depression. All nondepressed controls were
required to have no history or evidence of psychological disturbance and
to score below 14 on the BDl.
Recruiting Procedures.

We recruited subjects from these locations in
San Antonio, Texas: the Audie L. Murphy Veterans Administration (VA)
Hospital, a private clinic that routinely tests for the Texas Rehabilitation
Commission, and the staff of Trinity University. Almost all subjects from
the first two sources had previously volunteered for research in our
laboratory; the method of initial contact was described by Hertel and Rude
(1991). Eight of the 16 nondepressed controls had also participated in the
prior experiment; the remainder was recruited from Trinity University for
this study only. The fewest number of days elapsed between participation
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in the initial experiment and participation in this one was 42. The mean
was 118 days and did not differ reliably across diagnostic conditions.
Final Sample.

The data from 10 subjects were set aside. Of these,
three subjects reported perceiving almost no words on the test of word
identification and one subject perceived all 64 words. Two subjects met
ROC for anxiety but not depression; and three subjects met criteria for
depression without anxiety symptoms. {We had planned to categorise
depressed subjects according to the presence versus absence of anxiety,
but we failed to recruit enough nonanxious depressed subjects.) One
subject from Trinity scored high on the BOI, yet provided insufficient
information about clinical diagnosis and treatment.
The final sample consisted of 32 subjects, 16 in each group. The mean
age was 38 for nondepressed and 42 for depressed (a nonreliable difference).
Both groups had completed 14 years of education, on average. Their mean
scores on the WAIS-R Vocabulary Subscale were 10.6 for nondepressed
and 10.5 for depressed. One subject in each group was African-American;
5 nondepressed and 4 depressed subjects were Hispanic; the rest were
Anglo. Finally, 10 nondepressed but only 5 depressed subjects were
female.
Assignment.

In each category of depression, two subjects were
assigned to each combination of the rating list {the 32 words presented for
ratings), the order of sets within that list {the 16 words that appeared for
the first rating task), and the order of tasks {whether the emotional or
curvature ratings were made first).
Equal numbers of depressed and nondepressed subjects received each
of the four block orders on the test. The distribution of exposure durations
in the depressed group was: 100msec, 12%; 67msec, 19%; and 50msec,
69%. Of the nondepressed controls, 19% were assigned to 100msec
exposures, 6% to 67msec, 44% to 50msec, and 31% to 33msec.
RESULTS
Diagnostic Indices

Mean BOI scores were 5.1 for controls and 27.0 for depressed subjects.
Of the 16 depressed subjects, 14 met ROC for definite major depression,
1 met criteria for probable major depression, and 1 met criteria for
minor depression. All 16 depressed subjects showed symptoms of anxiety.
Twelve were currently medicated with anti-depressants and 3 with anti
anxiety drugs; 14 were currently under the care of a psychiatrist or
psychologist; 7 had been hospitalised previously for treatment of depression.
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No one in the control group met criteria for depression or anxiety,
although one subject reported using anti-anxiety medication within the
past month.
Identification

Word identification measures memory to the extent that previously
exposed words are identified more frequently than new words. This
difference is called the prior-processing effect (PPE) and is computed for
each subject by subtracting the percentage of new words identified in each
condition from the percentage of old words identified in the same
condition. The use of this measure presumes nonreliable differences in the
percentages of new items identified, which are shown in the top portion of
Table 1. These percentages were submitted to an analysis of variance,
which revealed no reliable differences according to group or type of word;
all Fs < 1.00. (The significance level for all analyses in this report was set
at .05.)
The bottom portion of Table 1 shows the mean PPE in each diagnostic
group and experimental condition. An analysis of variance performed on
this measure included a between-subjects factor for diagnostic group and
within-subjects factors for type of word (emotional vs. neutral) and type
of rating (emotion vs. curvature).
The effects of greatest interest were those involving rating type and
diagnostic group. Although the effect of the type of rating did not reliably
depend on group membership, F(1,30)
1.50, MSe
183.51, the simple
main effects of group within each type of rating task were evaluated as
=

=

TABLE 1
Mean Percentage of New Words Identified and the Prior-processing Effect (PPE)
Type

Rating Task
Neutral

of Word

Emotional

Average

Percentage of new words identified
Nondepressed

38

37

38

Depressed

33

32

32

Nondepressed

26

27

26

Depressed

16

29

22

Nondepressed

23

17

20

Depressed

12

9

10

Prior-processing effect
Emotional value

Curvature

Note: PPE

=

% of rated words

-

% of new words identified in each category.
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planned. The groups clearly differed in the effect of prior exposure in the
curvature task, F(1,30)
4.31, MSe
353.76. The mean PPE for these
words was 10% in the depressed group and 20% in the nondepressed
group. Depressed subjects' PPE was above baseline, F(1,15) 17.16, MSe
199.79. Further, although depressed subjects tended to produce a
smaller effect of prior exposure in the emotion-rating task (M
22% vs.
26% in the nondepressed group), the trend was not reliable, F < 1.00.
Other reliable effects revealed by the overall analysis of PPE included the
main effect of the type of task, F(1,30)
14.69, MSe
183.51; all subjects
showed a greater advantage of having rated emotional value. Further, that
effect was qualified by the reliable interaction of task with word type, F(1,30)
8.44, MSe
121.66. The PPE for emotional words was larger when they
had been rated for emotion (M 28% vs. 13% when rated for curvature),
F(1,30)
20.28, MSe
173.83. The respective means for neutral words
(21% vs. 18%) did not reliably differ, F(1,30)
1. 51, MSe
131.35.
No other effect in this analysis of PPE approached statistical significance.
An additional analysis, however, was performed by including a between
subjects factor for the order of the rating tasks. It yielded a reliable
interaction of order and type of task, F(1,28)
4.56, MSe
167.24. The
mean PPE for subjects who had rated curvature in the first block of words
was 14% for those words, but 29% for the second block of words rated
for emotional value. The difference between these two means was smaller
16% for curvature and 20% for
when emotion was rated first (M
emotion). No other effect involving task order was reliable; Fs < 1.20.
Apparently, the carry-over effects from rating emotion first were uniform
across other conditions.
=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

Free Recall

Table 2 presents the mean percentages of rated words recalled. The
analysis of variance included factors for group, rating task, and type of
TABLE 2
Mean Percentage of Words Recalled
Type of Word
Rating Task
Neutral

Emotional

Average

Nondepressed

34

44

39

Depressed

23

26

24

Nondepressed

20

22

21

Depressed

12

13

12

Emotional value

Curvature
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word and revealed only reliable main effects of the rating task, F(1, 30)
10.38, MSe
679.04, and group, F(1,30)
8.53, MSe
481.45. All
subjects recalled more words from the emotion-rating task (M
32% vs.
17% from the curvature task). Depressed subjects recalled fewer words
overall (M 18% vs. 30% by nondepressed subjects). Although there was
a trend for emotional words to be recalled more frequently, it was not
reliable, F(1,30)
2.99, MSe
197.59, P < 0.10. 2
The average number of words appearing for the first time on the
identification test (unrated words) that were subsequently recalled was
only 1.1. It did not appear to differ according to group or type of word.
Finally, recall was higher for identified words than unidentified words from
the rating tasks, F(1,30)
53.47, MSe
157.44. Nondepressed subjects
recalled 40% of rated words that they had identified, but only 12% of
unidentified words. The corresponding means in the depressed group were
23% and 9%.
=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

=

DISCUSSION

In comparison with nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects showed
reduced identification of words previously rated for their physical shape
but not for their emotional value, and reduced recall of all rated words.
These are the major findings as they were anticipated from the cognitive
initiative framework for describing depressive deficits in memory. That
framework predicts that impaired performance should be found on tasks
that benefit from the spontaneous use of uninstructed procedures, either
during initial exposure to the materials (Hertel & Rude, 1991) or during
the test phase (Hertel & Hardin, 1990). Although beneficial procedures
are less likely to be initiated by depressed subjects, they can be environ
mentally controlled to eliminate otherwise deficient performance (see
Hertel, 1992).
The design of the reported experiment invited initiative in attending to
words as such during the initial task of rating their physical shape, and
impaired initiative in that task was inferred from performance on the
subsequent test of word identification. That test is influenced, not by
elaborative processing during initial exposure and not by intentional
retrieval strategies at the time of the test, but by the degree to which letters
are integrated into lexical units that can then be read with greater
fluency on second exposure (Hayman & Jacoby, 1989; Whittlesea &
2

Further analyses were performed to investigate mood-congruent memory through the

examination of identification and recall of positive versus negative emotional words. None
of these analyses revealed evidence of mood congruence; however, the use of only four items
of each valence in each condition constrains the interpretation of this outcome.

324

HERTEL

Cantwell, 1987). The present results suggest that nondepressed subjects
spontaneously read these words more often than did depressed subjects,
because they were more likely to identify them on the test. 3
The same trend can be seen in the identification of words rated for
emotional value, although that difference did not approach statistical
significance. Because the trend contributed to the lack of a reliable
interaction between group and rating task, however, it is important to
notice the pattern obtained from depressed subjects. That is, depressed
subjects produced a PPE for emotionally rated emotional words (29%)
that was comparable to performance by controls, but the PPE for
emotionally rated neutral words (16%) was closer to their own perfor
mance on words rated for curvature. (The interaction of type of rating and
type of word within the depressed group was reliable, F(1,30) 8.85, MSe
121. 66.) A tentative interpretation of this pattern rests on the possible
relationship between the amount of time that subjects stared at the words
initially and the likelihood of later identification. Perhaps depressed
subjects spent less time looking at neutral words as they rated them for
emotional value and therefore identified them less readily upon second
exposure. This interpretation is possibly countermanded by results from
Jacoby and Dallas (1981, experiment 3), who varied the duration of
initial exposure from 1 second to 2 seconds and found that subsequent
identification was not affected, but the 6 seconds provided in the present
orienting task might permit individual variation sufficient to produce
differences. Further research would be necessary to support such a claim,
however, "looking" time might also account for an unanticipated finding:
Regardless of diagnosis, subjects were more likely to identify emotional
words when they had been rated for emotion than when they had been
rated for curvature. The resolution of such issues awaits more research on
the boundary conditions for observing relationships between emotion and
attentional control in both depressed and nondepressed states.
Similarly, continued exploration of boundary conditions on depressive
deficits in memory tasks is desirable. One suggested limit concerns the
nature of the test. Given appropriate attention to words qua words during
initial exposure, depressive deficits have not been found on indirect tests.4
Hertel and Hardin (1990) did not find deficits in spelling homphones, the
=

=

3

The results on word identification calls for a consideration of the extent to which subjects

are willing to blurt responses. The fact that approximately one-third of nondepressed subjects
but no depressed subjects were assigned to durations of 33msec suggests that depressed
subjects were less likely to blurt. What I assumed, however, is that the conservative tendency
would not vary with experimental conditions.
4

One apparent exception to this claim is the finding by Elliott and Greene (1992), but see

Roediger and McDermott's (1992) discussion of difficulties in interpreting their findings.
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less frequent meaning of which had been biased in the orienting task;
nondepressed and depressed students alike showed biased spellings of
previously presented homophones more often than new ones. Clinically
depressed samples in recent studies by Denny and Hunt (1992) and
Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, and Fuller (1992) showed no impairment
on tests of word-fragment completion and word-stem completion, respec
tively. Similarly, in this report the effect of prior exposure on the emotion
rating task was not reliably associated with depression. In short, this
finding augments the body of evidence that depressive deficits are not
found on indirect tests, as long as words are initially integrated.
On the other hand, depressive deficits are frequently found on
direct tests of memory. The present results from the test of free recall
are consistent with the usual pattern and, more importantly, show a
dissociation between indirect- and direct-test performance that is a
function of subjects' emotional state (see Roediger & McDermott, 1992).
This dissociation (rewords rated for emotion) helps to establish the claim
that identification and recall measure different retrieval procedures.
The most prevalent account of depressive impairments in free recall is
the cognitive-effort or resource-allocation account (Ellis & Ashbrook,
1988; Hasher & Zacks, 1979). These accounts hold that depression limits
(or occupies through preoccupation) the attentional resources that would
otherwise be available for performing cognitive tasks. Depressed subjects
therefore should be impaired on tests that benefit from relatively
effortful or resource-demanding procedures. Effort accounts, however,
fail to anticipate evidence for deficits in word identification; here, the
prerequisite for good performance is simply the prior integration of
letters into words-a procedure that is highly automatic under most
circumstances.
Plainly, the allocation of attentional resources is a central problem in
depression (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). In emphasising initiative, however,
the present account denies that depressive deficits should always occur on
resource-demanding tasks. The very tasks that are offered as resource
intensive by Ellis and Ashbrook (e.g. Ellis et al., 1984) can be performed
as well by depressed subjects as by nondepressed subjects, provided that
attention is well controlled (Hertel & Rude, 1991). For this reason, the
initiative account emphasises control rather than availability of resources
(see Ellis, 1990). Logically, the self-initiated switch of attention from
personal concerns (for example) to the task at hand is resource demanding,
but it is the switch itself that deserves our experimental and theoretical
attention.
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